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THE REASONABLE WOMAN: HAS SHE 
MADE A DIFFERENCE? 
Nicole Newman* 
LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING AND LEGAL THEORY. 
By Ann Scales. New York: New York University Press. 2006. Pp. 217. 
Abstract: It has been fifteen years since the Ninth Circuit decided to util-
ize the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases, and the 
Supreme Court has yet to comment on its legitimacy or the split in fed-
eral circuits. In Legal Feminism, Ann Scales promotes a feminist way of un-
derstanding law that takes history, suffering, and context seriously. 
Among other things, she identifies philosophical liberalism as a limiting 
rhetoric that hides structures of privilege behind a pretense of neutrality. 
Consequently, Scales prescribes eschewing neutrality to overcome the his-
toric equation of rationality with maleness, and to expose the colossal 
privilege that allows those in power to believe they are acting neutrally. 
Neutrality and its pretense are at the heart of the ongoing debate over the 
use of the “reasonable woman” instead of the “reasonable person” to sat-
isfy the objective prong of Title VII hostile work environment claims. This 
Book Review examines the evolution of the reasonable woman and ex-
plores her successes and failures in fifteen years of jurisprudence. 
Introduction 
 One of the primary topics Ann Scales discusses in Legal Feminism 
is how the illusion of neutrality in the law has presented special obsta-
cles to women and other historically disempowered groups.1 These 
special obstacles, she explains, exist for two reasons: (1) rationality has 
historically been equated with maleness, and (2) those in power also 
have the colossal privilege that allows them to believe that they are 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). 
1 Ann Scales, Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering, and Legal Theory 103 (Deb-
orah Gershenowitz ed., 2006). Some of these special obstacles include that “human” is de-
fined by maleness, that perception is not just given but is directed by socially constructed 
power relations, and that equality is guaranteed only when the sexes are already equal. See id. 
at 84, 86, 93. For further discussion on radical feminism’s attack on liberalism’s central 
principle of neutrality, see Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 
Fla. L. Rev. 133, 139–40 & n.29 (2005) (explaining the belief that the liberal state is at its 
worst when it is most neutral). 
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acting neutrally.2 Consequently, the illusion of neutrality converts the 
comfortable version of experience of those in power into an “objec-
tive” fact.3 The bottom line is that legal analysis that describes existing 
social imbalances as the neutral background of experience only serves 
those already in power by maintaining the status quo.4 
 Thirty years ago, the first American court recognized sexual har-
assment as discriminatory conduct that violates Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.5 Today, sexual harassment is widely accepted as a 
form of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.6 After three decades 
of increasing public awareness, it is somewhat difficult to remember 
that before 1976, federal courts refused to recognize sexual harassment 
as a form of discrimination.7 Although sexual harassment law is said to 
                                                                                                                      
2 Scales, supra note 1, at 103. She claims, “[A]ll of law is already an affirmative action 
plan for somebody (usually, for whoever got to write the law).” Id. at 77. 
3 Id. at 103. 
4 See id. at 86. 
5 Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the following: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D.D.C 1976), 
rev’d in part, vacated in part, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding retaliatory actions of 
male supervisor, taken because the female employee had declined his sexual advances, 
constituted sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see Jeffrey A. 
Gettle, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard: Is It a Viable Solution?, 31 Duq. 
L. Rev. 841, 843 & n.9 (1993) (explaining the origins of sexual harassment in Williams). 
Sexual harassment has gained a majority of its attention over the past thirty years when 
male political figures have been accused of harassment. See Noelle C. Brennan, Hostile En-
vironment Sexual Harassment: The Hostile Environment of a Courtroom, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 545, 
545 (1995) (noting heightened awareness of sexual harassment after the Clarence Thomas 
and Anita Hill debacle); Tam B. Tran, Title VII Hostile Work Environment: A Different Perspec-
tive, 9 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 357, 357 (1998) (noting the wake of the dismissal of 
Paula Jones’s sexual harassment suit against President Bill Clinton as a catalyst for address-
ing the status of the law). For example, in the three months following the Clarence Tho-
mas confirmation hearings, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
reported a seventy percent increase in the reports of sexual harassment, as compared to 
the previous year. Brennan, supra at 545 n.3. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2; see Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reason-
able Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 633, 640 (2002). 
7 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 645–46. In Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., two fe-
male clerical workers alleged that they were repeatedly sexually propositioned and mo-
lested by a supervisor. 390 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 
1977). The court denied relief for the plaintiffs, stating that the supervisor’s conduct was a 
“personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism” that “had no relationship to the nature of 
employment.” Id. at 163. Courts tended to relegate the problem of sexual harassment to 
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have subversive legislative origins, its evolution is now well documented 
among legal scholars.8 
 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the 
basis of sex.9 Although sexual harassment encompasses many types of 
conduct, two broad categories are defined by the EEOC guidelines as 
actionable under Title VII.10 The first is “quid pro quo” sexual harass-
ment, which is harassment that involves the conditioning of employ-
ment or employment benefits on sexual favors.11 The second, more 
                                                                                                                      
the private sphere, attributing the conduct to “satisfying a personal urge” rather than “sex 
discrimination.” See Brennan, supra note 5, at 552. 
8 Brennan, supra note 5, at 551 & nn.37–39. According to Brennan, when originally in-
troduced, Title VII did not include a prohibition against sex discrimination. Id. at 551. At 
the last minute, it was added by Rep. Howard Smith from Virginia in an effort to make the 
bill so controversial that it would fail. Id. The amendment passed with a 168–133 margin. 
Id.; see Penny L. Cigoy, Harmless Amusement or Sexual Harassment?: The Reasonableness of the 
Reasonable Woman Standard, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 1071, 1072 & nn.9–10 (1993). For an in depth 
discussion of the evolution of sexual harassment law, see Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A 
Short History of Sexual Harassment, in Directions in Sexual Harassment 1 (Catharine A. 
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Tran, supra note 5, at 359–69; Brennan, supra 
note 5, at 550–60; Cigoy, supra 8, at 1072–78; Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, 
Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable Woman” Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 
61 Fordham L. Rev. 773, 777–98 (1993). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); see Deborah S. Brenneman, From a Woman’s Point of View: 
The Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1281, 
1283 (1992). During the 1970s, the American judiciary had to be persuaded that sexual 
harassment is “discrimination on the basis of sex.” Siegel, supra note 8, at 9. The refusal to 
acknowledge that sexual harassment had anything to do with employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex was grounded in the argument that it could happen to a man or woman 
or both; even if its harms were inflicted on women only, they were not inflicted on all 
women, only those who refused their supervisors’ advances. See id. at 11; see also Adler & 
Pierce, supra note 8, at 788–92 (articulating the primary inquiry as whether “but for the 
fact of her sex, [the plaintiff] would not have been the object of harassment”) (quoting 
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); see Gettle, supra note 5, at 842; Shoenfelt et al., supra 
note 6, at 640. The Act only prohibits unwelcome sexual conduct that affects a term or 
condition of employment, not all conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace. Shoenfelt et 
al., supra note 6, at 640. In 1980, EEOC issued guidelines that established the criteria of 
determining when unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment, 
defined circumstances for employer liability, and suggested measures an employer should 
take to prevent sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998); Shoenfelt et al., supra 
note 6, at 640. The guidelines describe sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” in cer-
tain circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). 
11 Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1283. Quid pro quo harassment is the traditional and 
most obvious form of sexual harassment. Gettle, supra note 5, at 842. The first successful 
quid pro quo case was Williams v. Saxbe, which found in favor of the plaintiff that retalia-
tory actions such as poor performance appraisals and underserved reprimands had been 
taken against an employee for refusing unwanted sexual advances. See 413 F. Supp. 654, 
655–56, 657 (D.D.C 1976), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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subtle type of sexual harassment is “hostile work environment.”12 A hos-
tile work environment arises when the unwelcome sexual conduct un-
reasonably interferes with the individual’s job performance, or creates 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.13 
 Fifteen years ago, the Ninth Circuit was the first court to un-
equivocally adopt the reasonable woman standard in hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims to determine whether the unwel-
come conduct was objectively offensive enough to trigger liability.14 
Today, the Third Circuit is the only court that has clearly followed the 
Ninth Circuit by employing the “reasonable person of the same sex in 
that position.”15 Meanwhile, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have clearly rejected a gender-specific standard.16 To date, the 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 642. 
13 Adler & Pierce, supra note 8, at 780. The Court first recognized a hostile work envi-
ronment claim in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). Because hostile 
environment sexual harassment is the less detectible form of harassment, it is not surpris-
ing that it was not recognized for a full ten years after quid pro quo claims had been 
adopted. See id.; Gettle, supra note 5, at 842. 
14 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). Although prior cases adopted 
similar standards, Ellison was the first to affirmatively hold that a female plaintiff states a 
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment “when she alleges conduct 
which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. at 879 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted); see Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 
1990) (holding that discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the 
same sex in that position); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636–37 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(adopting the reasonable woman standard in constructive discharge actions involving sex-
ual harassment by a male supervisor); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 
(6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s use of the reasonable 
person perspective instead of reasonable woman); Cigoy, supra note 8, at 1079–88 (detail-
ing the origins of the reasonable woman standard through case law). 
15 Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1492; Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 637–38 & nn.25–26. 
16 Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding no reversible er-
ror in “reasonable person” standard after Harris); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 
1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding the “reasonable person” standard appropriate after the 
Supreme Court’s use in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)); Hartleip v. 
McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 1996) (adopting Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 
155, 165 (Mich. 1993), and concluding “that a gender-conscious standard must be re-
jected”); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(“The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a ‘reasonable woman.’”), cert 
denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995). 
The remaining circuits, the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth apply the rea-
sonable person standard in the great majority of cases, but have never actually rejected the 
use of the reasonable woman standard. See, e.g., Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of 
Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying the reasonable person standard); 
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 269 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying the reasonable per-
son standard); Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
hostile work environment requires both subjective and objective severity or pervasiveness); 
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U.S. Supreme Court has failed to answer the question at the heart of 
the debate: whose perspective objectively determines whether the 
plaintiff should have been offended by the alleged harassment?17 
 In light of Scales’s warning against the illusion of neutrality, this 
Book Review examines the value of a measure taken by some jurisdic-
tions to eschew a gender-neutral standard because it “tends to be male-
biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women.”18 
Part I of this Book Review briefly summarizes sexual harassment law, 
addresses the leading cases that define it as a cause of action, and ac-
counts for the origins of the split in the federal circuits over the reason-
ableness standard.19 Part II maps out the heated debate over the advan-
tages and disadvantages of using the reasonable woman instead of the 
reasonable person as the objective perspective in hostile environment 
cases. Part III surveys the federal circuits to provide a glimpse of the 
different rates at which plaintiffs have established, in the least, that the 
harassing conduct created an objectively hostile work environment.20 
By analyzing these varying success rates over the past fifteen years, this 
Book Review will conclude that this highly debated difference in rea-
sonableness standards has had little practical effect.21 
                                                                                                                      
Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2004) (considering reasonable woman, 
but applying the reasonable person standard); Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 
1219 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying the reasonable person standard). 
17 Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable Woman 
Standard Another Chance, 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 195, 204 (2001); Shoenfelt et al., supra 
note 6, at 636. 
18 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. 
19 Considering the wealth of detailed documentation of the origins and evolution of 
sexual harassment law under Title VII, Part I seeks only to provide a brief overview of the 
pertinent history and current status of the law. See infra Part I. 
20 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
21 For the purposes of this Book Review, the “success rates” refer to any favorable out-
come for the plaintiff regarding the objectively hostile element of the claim. For example, 
successes would include both Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 387, 400–01 (1st Cir. 
2002), where the court affirmed the jury verdict against employer for all elements of plain-
tiff’s hostile work environment claim, and Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 837, 838 n.2 
(10th Cir. 2005), where the court overturned the district court grant of summary judg-
ment against plaintiff hostile work environment claim, but noted that employer liability 
remained an issue for remand. However, plaintiff success would not include Whittaker, 
where the court found the offensive conduct was neither severe nor pervasive enough to 
create objectively hostile work environment. See 424 F.3d at 646. 
Although each jurisdiction has developed somewhat different elements required to es-
tablish a prima facie case for hostile work environment, they all include requirements of 
sufficient objective severity or pervasiveness and some basis of employer liability. See, e.g., 
O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that, to establish 
a hostile work environment, plaintiff must show: “(1) that she (or he) is a member of a 
protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the 
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I. Vague Supreme Court Decisions Split the Circuits 
A. Judicial Recognition of the Reasonable Woman 
 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court set the standards for 
hostile work environment claims under Title VII.22 Vinson filed a claim 
of sexual harassment against her supervisor and the bank.23 She alleged 
that the supervisor fondled her in front of other employees, followed 
her into the women's restroom, exposed himself to her, and even forci-
bly raped her on several occasions.24 
 Ruling in favor of Vinson, the Supreme Court found that a hostile 
work environment theory existed under Title VII, which meant that the 
tangible or economic injuries needed to show quid pro quo harassment 
were no longer the only means of stating a claim.25 In addition, the 
Court articulated that a valid Title VII sexual harassment claim “must 
be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the vic-
tim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”26 
The Court successfully established a sexual harassment violation based 
on a hostile work environment, but it failed to specify the reasonable-
ness standard by which the harassment should be viewed.27 Following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor, the circuit courts split over 
whether the conduct involved in a sexual harassment claim should be 
                                                                                                                      
harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or perva-
sive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work envi-
ronment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively 
offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in 
fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been estab-
lished”). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 
(1986); Adler & Pierce, supra note 8, at 781. 
23 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. 
24 Id. Vinson estimated that over the course of four years, he had coerced her into hav-
ing intercourse approximately forty or fifty times. Id. 
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. The Court found that “the lan-
guage of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase 
‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment.” Meritor, 
477 U.S. at 64. The Court also recognized that the district court had erred by focusing on 
the “voluntariness” of the victim’s participation as opposed to the victim’s conduct as an 
indication that the advances were unwelcome. Id. at 68. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897, 904 (1982)). 
27 See Hill, supra note 1, at 172; Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 642. 
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judged from the viewpoint of the reasonable person or the reasonable 
woman.28 
 When the Sixth Circuit decided Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. in 
1986, it held that to prevail in a hostile environment claim a plaintiff 
must show that the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work 
and created a hostile work environment that affected her psychologi-
cal well-being.29 Among other complaints, Rabidue claimed that, on a 
daily basis, male employees displayed pictures of nude and semi-nude 
women on calendars, on desks, and on posters.30 
 To determine whether Rabidue had satisfied her burden of proof, 
meaning that the harassment had created a hostile work environment 
and had affected her psychological well-being, the majority opinion 
asked how a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have per-
ceived the conduct.31 Furthermore, through the perspective of a rea-
sonable person, the court stated that the sexual posters only had a de 
minimus effect on Rabidue’s work environment considering the com-
mon exploitation of women in film, television, radio, and other public 
places.32 
 Judge Damon Keith’s dissent in Rabidue is generally credited as the 
origin of the reasonable woman standard in hostile work environment 
claims.33 Stressing a wide divergence between most women's views of 
appropriate sexual conduct and those of men, Judge Keith advocated 
                                                                                                                      
28 Compare Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(adopting the reasonable woman standard), Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 
1991) (adopting the reasonable woman standard), Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 
1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (employing a reasonable person of the same sex standard), Lipsett 
v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting the importance of the woman’s per-
spective), and Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636–37 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting the reason-
able woman standard), with Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (apply-
ing the reasonable person standard), and Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (applying the reasonable person standard). 
29 805 F.2d 611, 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff failed to sustain her 
burden of proving that she was victim of Title VII sexual harassment). 
30 See id. at 623–24 (Keith, J., dissenting). One of the posters, which had been on the 
wall for eight years, showed a naked woman lying supine with a golf ball between her 
breasts and a man standing over her, with a golf club raised, yelling “Fore!” Id. at 624. 
Rabidue also brought a claim against her supervisor, who made explicit and vulgar com-
ments, including calling women whores, cunts, and pussies, and, when referring to 
Rabidue, saying, “All that bitch needs is a good lay,” and calling her a “fat ass.” Id. 
31 Id. at 620 (majority opinion). 
32 See id. at 622. 
33 Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting). In drafting his dissent, Judge Keith relied heavily on 
a 1984 law review article, Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under 
Title VII, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1451, 1459 (1984) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Claims]. 
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the adoption of the new standard.34 He reasoned that Title VII's precise 
purpose was to prevent discriminatory behavior and attitudes from poi-
soning the work environment of classes protected under the Act.35 Fur-
thermore, Judge Keith warned that unless the outlook of the reason-
able woman was adopted, defendants and courts would continue to 
perpetuate ingrained notions of reasonable behavior defined by the 
offenders—in most cases, men.36 
 Although Judge Keith is credited with the introduction of the rea-
sonable woman standard to hostile environment sexual harassment 
claims, the Ninth Circuit was the first court to explicitly adopt it, and 
did so in Ellison v. Brady.37 In Ellison, the plaintiff filed a hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claim against her employer, charging 
that her co-worker sexually harassed her by repeatedly asking her out 
and sending her strange letters.38 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant and explicitly refused to follow the Rabidue standard.39 
 Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted the perspective of a reasonable 
woman primarily because it found that “a sex-blind reasonable person 
standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the 
experiences of women.”40 The court asserted that the sexual experiences 
of women were different than those of men, and therefore, conduct that 
many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women.41 
                                                                                                                      
34 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). For more detailed discussions of the 
differing perspectives of men and women, see Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 667. 
35 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); see Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
Judge Keith continues, “As I believe no woman should be subjected to an environment 
where her sexual dignity and reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally or physically as-
saulted as a matter of prevailing male prerogative, I dissent.” See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626–
27 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
36 See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). Studies show that women face a 
twenty-five percent probability of being raped by a man, and a forty-six percent probability 
of being sexually assaulted in their lifetimes. Kerns, supra note 17, at 215–16. 
37 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Cigoy, supra note 8, at 1079. 
38 See 924 F.2d at 873–74. The letters implied an intimacy that was imagined by her co-
worker, and was frightening to Ellison. Id. at 874. Ellison testified that she “thought he was 
crazy,” and she “didn’t know what he would do next.” Id. 
39 Id. at 877, 883. 
40 Id. at 879. Paralleling Judge Keith’s warning, the Ellison court noted, “If we only ex-
amined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we 
would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could 
continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and 
victims of harassment would have no remedy.” Id. at 878; see Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 
(Keith, J., dissenting). 
41 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described these differ-
ing experiences in the opinion as the following: 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Silence 
 The landmark Ellison decision initiated the development of the 
controversial reasonable woman standard, which some circuits have 
followed and others have not.42 Since 1991, the Supreme Court has had 
multiple opportunities to comment on this divide, but it has instead 
opted to address other issues.43 Some suggest that the Supreme Court’s 
continued silence, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc., implies that it has accepted and possibly 
endorsed the existence of the reasonable woman.44 
 However, the primary issue in the Harris abusive work environ-
ment claim was the same as that in Rabidue : whether the plaintiff must 
suffer psychological injury to have an actionable claim.45 Harris was 
                                                                                                                      
[B]ecause women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, 
women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. 
Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may under-
standably worry whether a harasser’s conduct is merely a prelude to violent 
sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual 
conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the 
underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive. 
Id. 
42 See, e.g., Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying a reason-
able person of same sex in that position standard); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Offi-
cers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the reasonable woman as the objec-
tive standard), cert denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995). 
43 See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004) (allowing an affirmative de-
fense in a sexual harassment constructive discharge claim); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848 (2001) (holding that front pay is not an element of com-
pensatory damages in a hostile work environment claim under Civil Rights Act of 1991); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998) (subjecting employer to vicari-
ous liability for certain hostile environment claims); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (extending sexual harassment claims to male on male harass-
ment); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 810 (1998) (adopting vicarious liabil-
ity of employer under Title VII, affirmative defenses); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 247 (1994) (establishing a right to recover under the provisions of Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 for a case pending on appeal during enactment); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (invalidating a psychological injury requirement). 
44 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79; Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Hill, supra note 1, at 172. 
45 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Because the Meritor decision initiated the circuit court split 
over whether to apply the reasonable person standard or reasonable woman standard, it 
seemed likely that in 1993, the Supreme Court would comment on the debate in Harris. 
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Meritor, 447 U.S. at 68; Kerns, supra note 17, at 206–07; Brennan, 
supra note 5, at 547. In fact, the trial court in Harris applied the reasonable woman stan-
dard, but the plaintiff did not specifically ask the Supreme Court to consider the propriety 
of the standard. 976 F.2d at 733, 733 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 17; see Paul B. 
Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 Wake For-
est L. Rev. 619, 668 (1993). 
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often insulted because of her gender and made the target of un-
wanted sexual innuendos.46 The Supreme Court held that so long as 
the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as 
hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically 
injurious.47 The Court set a totality of circumstances test to determine 
whether an environment would be considered hostile or abusive.48 
 Describing the limits of an actionable claim, Justice O’Connor 
wrote, “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an ob-
jectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s 
purview.”49 Despite the Court’s use of the term “reasonable person,” it 
never explicitly rejected the “reasonable woman” test, leaving both 
feminists and courts confused over which legal standard is the more 
appropriate for sexual harassment claims.50 Following Harris, the lower 
courts continued to split on the question of the appropriate objective 
standard.51 
                                                                                                                      
46 Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. On several occasions in front of others, the president said to 
Harris, “’You’re a woman, what do you know’ and ’We need a man as the rental manager’; 
at least once, he told her she was ‘a dumb ass woman.’” Id. He suggested that the two of 
them “go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris’s] raise.” Id. He occasionally asked Harris 
and other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket; he threw objects on 
the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up. Id. 
After Harris complained to him about his conduct, he apologized, only to start up again a 
month later. Id. Despite all this, the district court found in favor of the defendant, reason-
ing that the president’s comments were not so severe as to seriously affect Harris’ psycho-
logical well-being. Id. at 20. 
47 Id. at 22. 
48 Id. at 23. These circumstances include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-
ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work performance. Id. 
49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. Both the objective and the 
subjective prongs must be satisfied, otherwise the conduct has not actually altered the 
conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation. Harris, 510 U.S. 
at 21. The subjective prong is satisfied when the victim actually perceives the environment 
to be hostile or abusive. Id. 
50 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Kerns, supra note 17, at 208. Some interpreted the Court’s 
opinion as favoring the reasonable person standard because it used the term “reasonable 
person” throughout the opinion. Kerns, supra note 17, at 208. Others point out the Court’s 
emphasis on answering only the limited question on psychological injury, not all of the 
potential questions raised by the decision. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22–23; Hill, supra note 1, 
at 174–75; Kerns, supra note 17, at 208. 
51 See, e.g., Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the stan-
dard of a reasonable person of same sex in that position); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police 
Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the reasonable woman as the 
objective standard), cert denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995). 
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 Almost five years later, the Court broadened the extent of action-
able hostile work environment sexual harassment, providing a claim for 
same-sex harassment in Oncale.52 In applying the Meritor and Harris de-
cisions, the Court in Oncale elaborated explicitly on the objective per-
spective from which the harassment should be judged.53 The perspec-
tive should be that of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, 
considering “all the circumstances.”54 The factors the Court specified as 
“all of the circumstances” were much more far-reaching and sensitive to 
the social context of the alleged harassment than those originally iden-
tified in Harris.55 Furthermore, the Oncale Court’s emphasis on placing 
“the reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position” to answer the ques-
tion of severity has led some scholars to argue that Oncale’s redefinition 
of Harris not only protects the reasonable woman standard, but may 
implicitly encourage its use.56 Whether or not the Supreme Court in-
tended to implicitly endorse the reasonable woman standard, it has yet 
to clearly accept or reject the standard, and the circuit courts remain 
split.57 
                                                                                                                      
52 See 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). On several occasions, Oncale was forcibly subjected to 
sex-related, humiliating actions, including being physically assaulted in a sexual manner 
and threatened with rape by supervisors and a co-worker. See id. at 77. The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court decision that there was no cause of action for male-on-male 
harassment under Title VII, but the Supreme Court rejected that outright. Id. at 77, 79. 
Although male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal 
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII, Congress did intend “to strike 
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.” See id. 
at 78, 79; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
53 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. 
54 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 
55 Id. at 81–82; Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
In same–sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consid-
eration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is ex-
perienced by its target. . . . The real social impact of workplace behavior often 
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words 
used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sen-
sitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between 
simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and con-
duct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely 
hostile or abusive. 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82. 
56 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82; Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Hill, supra note 1, at 175. 
57 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 636. 
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II. Mapping out the Debate 
 Over the past fifteen years, the reasonable woman standard has 
received much attention in academic literature.58 In fact, a study exam-
ining every reported federal district and appellate court opinion be-
tween 1986 and 1995 involving sexual harassment in the workplace 
found “more articles discussing the reasonable woman standard than 
courts adopting [it].”59 The crux of the debate lies in defining the pur-
pose of Title VII and how best to achieve it.60 
 Those in favor of the reasonable woman standard view the precise 
purpose of Title VII as preventing behavior that is so debilitating that it 
hinders a woman’s job performance and thereby denies her an equal 
opportunity to achieve.61 From that perspective, the reasonable woman 
standard is a means of narrowing the divergent perceptions of men and 
women regarding acceptable behavior.62 Consequently, they reason, if 
male perceptions of acceptable behavior could be changed to more 
closely match those held by women, more men would reject the harass-
ing conduct that poisons a female victim’s work environment.63 The 
hope is that greater success for female plaintiffs in the courtroom will 
more accurately reflect the reality of sexual harassment as experienced 
by American working women.64 
 In contrast, those opposed to the reasonable woman standard ar-
gue that it is inherently contrary to the principle of equality under Title 
VII.65 In that light, a separate reasonableness standard for women is 
actually a legal setback because it sends the message that women are 
inherently unreasonable.66 Furthermore, some suggest that it is both 
unfair and confusing for male fact-finders and well-intentioned em-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 548, 584 (2001). 
59 See id. 
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 58, at 583–84 & 
nn.140–41. 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1306; see also Rabidue v. 
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting) (“In my view, 
Title VII’s precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and attitudes from poisoning the 
work environment of classes protected under the Act.”). 
62 See Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1305. 
63 See id. at 1306. 
64 See Kerns, supra note 17, at 229; Angela Baker, Comment, Employment Law—The 
“Reasonable Woman” Standard Under Ellison v. Brady: Implications for Assessing the Severity of 
Sexual Harassment and the Adequacy of Employer Response, 17 J. Corp. L. 691, 713 (1992). 
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 58, at 583 & n.141. 
66 See Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 Lab. 
Law. 203, 203, 210 (1992). 
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ployers to be asked to apply such a standard.67 Although the majority of 
this vigorous debate has taken place in the abstract, each side’s ration-
ale has fueled the ongoing circuit split.68 
A. Arguments for the Reasonable Woman Standard 
1. Divergent Perceptions, Divergent Worlds 
 Central to the argument made by proponents of the reasonable 
woman standard, including the Ellison majority, is that men and women 
perceive certain interpersonal behaviors differently.69 They emphasize 
research showing that behavior that many men consider not only harm-
less and innocent, but even flattering, is perceived as offensive by many 
women.70 This gap between male and female perceptions, they claim, 
indicates a lack of social consensus on the appropriate standard of be-
havior.71 
 The reason proponents give for such divergent perceptions is that 
men and women actually live in materially different social worlds, struc-
tured by a gender hierarchy.72 The differences between these two 
worlds include an economic and professional disparity between men 
and women, which creates unequal positions of power in the work-
force.73 Furthermore, they point out that women live under a constant 
threat of sex-related violence.74 Most victims of sexual harassment in 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Saba Ashraf, Note, The Reasonableness of the “Reasonable Woman” Standard: An 
Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 483, 484 (1992). 
68 See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 33, at 1455); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 58, at 584. 
69 See Baker, supra note 64, at 702 (“Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable 
may offend many women.”) (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
70 See Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment . . . Some See it . . . 
Some Won’t, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.–Apr. 1981, at 78; Kerns, supra note 17, at 215 & n.100; 
Deborah B. Goldberg, The Road to Equality: The Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard 
in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 195, 211–12 (1995); Cigoy, supra note 
8, at 1093–94; Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1293–94; Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: 
Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 Harv. Women’s L.J. 35, 52 & n.56 (1990). 
71 Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 33, at 1451. Dissenting in Rabidue, Judge Keith 
noted the irony in using the reasonable person standard to define sexual harassment be-
cause the notions of reasonable behavior according to that standard were fashioned by the 
offenders themselves—men. See 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting); 
Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1290. 
72 See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 
1169, 1209 (1998); Baker, supra note 64, at 702. 
73 See Kerns, supra note 17, at 219. 
74 See id. at 215 & n.101. 
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the workplace are women, and women are victims of assault and rape in 
disproportionately higher numbers than men.75 Therefore, they claim 
that women will be more sensitive than men to conduct that is sexual in 
nature because to women any form of sexual conduct, even the most 
mild, may instinctively trigger concern that the conduct will lead to a 
more violent sexual assault.76 
 Some of those in favor of the gendered reasonableness standard 
insist that the workplace is under male control.77 This means that sex-
ual harassment functions to preserve male supremacy and reinforce 
masculine norms, particularly where the entry of a woman into a par-
ticular workforce appears to call that control into question.78 Fre-
quently, proponents maintain, sexual harassment has more to do with 
power than with sexual desire.79 Therefore, these forms of sexual har-
assment are directed at women as a group as an accepted mode of ex-
pressing masculinity or masculine camaraderie, thereby entrenching 
male norms in the workplace.80 
 Sexual harassment is not a gender-neutral problem.81 Therefore, 
according to advocates of the reasonable woman standard, a gender-
neutral standard is simply inadequate because it will never reflect nor 
protect the unique interests of its victims.82 
2. “Gender-Neutral” Is Male-Biased 
 Furthermore, advocates of the reasonable woman standard claim, 
the reasonable person standard is inherently male-biased and it system-
atically ignores the experiences of women.83 They stress that American 
jurisprudence has historically evaluated conduct by comparing it to 
contemporary societal norms, represented by the “reasonable man.”84 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Cigoy, supra note 8, at 1094. One proponent noted that one in three women in 
America will be raped, and at least one out of two women will be sexually harassed during 
her educational or professional career. See Kerns, supra note 17, at 209 nn.73–74. 
76 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Cigoy, supra note 8, at 1094–95. 
77 See Hill, supra note 1, at 173. 
78 See Abrams, supra note 72, at 1205–06. 
79 Kenealy, supra note 66, at 204. 
80 See Abrams, supra note 72, at 1213. 
81 Kerns, supra note 17, at 197. 
82 See id. at 196, 197. 
83 See Ellison 924 F.2d at 879; Goldberg, supra note 70, at 212; Hill, supra note 1, at 173; 
Kerns, supra note 17, at 210. 
84 Walter Christopher Arbery, Note, A Step Backward for Equality Principles: The “Reason-
able Woman” Standard in Title VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 Ga. 
L. Rev. 503, 541 (1993); see Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment 
Law—Will It Really Make a Difference?, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 227, 232–33 (1993). 
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This tradition left women, among other groups, excluded from discus-
sions on reasonableness in the law.85 Moreover, these advocates high-
light the relatively recent replacement of the term “reasonable man” 
with “reasonable person” in a judicial attempt to create a sex-blind 
standard of neutrality.86 However, many believe that the reasonable per-
son has always maintained its masculine roots because the one-word 
substitution did not catalyze a change in the underlying model.87 
Therefore, this attempt at political correctness may have merely ob-
scured the sexism within the law instead of eradicating it.88 By applying 
this standard, advocates reason, courts hide behind a guise of neutrality 
while they actually apply an unchanged, male-biased standard.89 
 According to proponents of the reasonable woman standard, this 
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the majority of judges 
are men, and that they apply a legal standard from their male perspec-
tive.90 They argue that, at the very least, the gender-specific reasonable-
ness standard forces male fact-finders to address the hypothetical rea-
sonable woman’s perspective that they would otherwise ignore.91 
Otherwise, proponents contend, these male fact-finders would simply 
reinforce “the prevailing level of discrimination” against women if al-
lowed to adhere to the male-biased standard.92 However, the fact that 
offensive behavior is common does not make it welcome, wanted, or 
acceptable to women.93 Nor does the fact that such behavior is common 
                                                                                                                      
85 See Kerns, supra note 17, at 210. 
86 See Arbery, supra note 84, at 541; Kerns, supra note 17, at 210. 
87 See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal Educ. 3, 
23 (1988); Kerns, supra note 17, at 218. 
88 See Bender, supra note 87, at 21–23. 
89 See Abrams, supra note 72, at 1173 (citing Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment 
with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 464–71 (1997)); Goldberg, supra note 70, at 212. 
90 See Kerns, supra note 17, at 210. One scholar argues: 
[Judges] deny claims they deem unjustified because of one of four miscon-
ceptions: 1) if a work environment is sexually charged, women assume the 
risk of sexual harassment by entering it; 2) some women deserve and/or wel-
come sexual harassment; 3) women complaining of sexual harassment are 
not credible; or 4) men’s “innocent flirting” will suddenly become actionable 
as sexual harassment. 
Brennan, supra note 5, at 549–50 (footnotes omitted). For an extensive discussion on the 
application of these judicial misconceptions in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., see Nancy S. 
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harass-
ment Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1177, 1193–1208 (1990). 
91 See Gettle, supra note 5 at 856. 
92 Hill, supra note 1, at 173 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
93 Pollack, supra note 70, at 65. 
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mean that a woman is not negatively affected by it.94 Without the rea-
sonable woman standard, as the Ellison Court articulated, “[h]arassers 
could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory 
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no rem-
edy.”95 Consequently, these proponents consider the reasonable woman 
standard necessarily preferable to the reasonable person standard be-
cause they believe that the former is a male-biased “gender neutral” 
standard that only reinforces a male-dominated status quo.96 
3. Effectuating Title VII 
 Those in favor of the reasonable woman standard assert that Title 
VII was designed to eliminate barriers to equal opportunity, whether 
those barriers are constructed negligently or intentionally.97 They insist 
that the reasonable woman standard does not establish a higher level of 
protection for women than men; it simply allows women to participate 
in the workforce on equal footing with men.98 In general, courts that 
have adopted the woman’s view as the norm have done so with the in-
tent to heighten male sensitivity to the effects of sexually offensive con-
duct in the workplace.99 The hope is that this heightened sensitivity will 
bridge the gender gap on perceptions of harassing conduct.100 Ulti-
mately, as the theory goes, this will actually affect the behavior of the 
workers and supervisors who create discrimination and deny opportu-
nity through sexual harassment.101 
 These proponents maintain that Title VII was not intended to af-
firm the status quo, but rather “to strike at the entire spectrum of dis-
parate treatment of men and women in employment.”102 Therefore, in 
order for it to succeed, Title VII must be interpreted in a way that can 
actually “bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of 
                                                                                                                      
94 Id. 
95 924 F.2d at 878. 
96 See Gettle, supra note 5, at 856. 
97 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(1)(a) (1994); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 979; see Brenneman, supra 
note 9, at 1297. 
98 Goldberg, supra note 70, at 212. 
99 Sexual Harassment Claims, supra note 33, at 1459. Some objectors to the reasonable 
woman standard have expressed concern that many lawsuits might be filed against men 
who simply did not realize their actions were harassing. See id. at 1459 n.55; Brenneman, 
supra note 9, at 1296. 
100 See Gettle, supra note 5, at 857–58. 
101 See Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1306. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); see 
Pollack, supra note 70, at 65. 
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American workers.”103 Proponents believe that the reasonable woman 
standard does just that by rejecting the hidden male bias in a “gender-
neutral” standard, and reflecting instead the perspective of those the 
law actually seeks to protect—women.104 
B. Arguments for the Reasonable Person Standard 
1. Defending the Reasonable Person 
 In contrast, those who support the reasonable person standard 
contend that it is necessary because it provides a neutral and abstract 
measure so that the law is not decided according to the whims of indi-
vidual judges or juries, but rather based on societal consensus.105 Fur-
thermore, the reasonable person represents an average or typical per-
son, accounting for all weaknesses tolerated by the community, and for 
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the act in question.106 
 This defense stems from the idea that objectivity and judicial neu-
trality are fundamental precepts of American jurisprudence.107 The 
principle of “reasonableness” is appealing, therefore, because it pro-
vides an objective means of superimposing community standards upon 
an individual and because its application requires judicial neutrality.108 
Consequently, in order to function effectively, “reasonableness” must at 
least be facially neutral because prevailing social norms determine its 
boundaries.109 
 For that reason, the major flaw these defenders find with the rea-
sonable woman standard is that it is not even facially neutral.110 In fact, 
it is specifically constructed to categorically exclude the male perspec-
                                                                                                                      
103 See Brenneman, supra note 9, at 1306 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 
805 F.2d 611, 620–22 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
104 See Kerns, supra, note 17, at 230. 
105 Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in 
Theory and in Practice, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1398, 1431 (1992); see also W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32 (5th ed. 1984) (“The standard of con-
duct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than 
the individual judgment, good or bad of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as pos-
sible, the same for all persons, since law can have no favorites.”) (footnotes omitted). 
106 See Keeton et al., supra note 105, § 32; Adler & Pierce, supra note 8, at 807. 
107 See Robert Unikel, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in 
American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 326, 328, 329 (1992). 
108 See id. at 329. Unikel describes the American legal system’s need for objectivity as 
deriving from an attempt to reconcile the basic contradiction between an individual’s 
freedom to act and an individual’s security from the effects of others’ actions. See id. at 328. 
109 See id. at 348. 
110 See id. at 357. 
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tive and establish female norms as the sole measure of appropriate 
conduct in certain circumstances.111 Defenders argue that by explicitly 
promoting only the interests and ideals of women, the reasonable 
woman standard violates the fundamental principle of neutrality.112 
Moreover, it violates each individual’s right to equal treatment under 
the law because it is not “indifferent and the same to all parties.”113 
Therefore, unlike the reasonable person, the reasonable woman stan-
dard corrupts formal equality because it is not neutral, and it blatantly 
differentiates between parties.114 
2. More Harm Than Good 
 Although the intentions behind the reasonable woman standard 
may be noble, opponents argue that its problems overwhelm its utility 
for women as a group because it (1) essentializes women, (2) affirms 
and entrenches gender stereotypes, and (3) undermines the legitimacy 
of sexual harassment claims.115 
 Feminists who oppose the gendered legal standard emphasize that 
different women define harassing behavior differently.116 They point 
out that the same suggestive conduct may strike some women as har-
assment, while others might accept it as normal.117 Moreover, women 
cannot be considered a homogeneous group because they each have 
different experiences, views, and perceptions.118 Opponents argue that 
the reasonable woman standard ignores those differences because it 
requires that all harassing behavior conform to certain acceptable cri-
                                                                                                                      
111 Id. 
112 Unikel, supra note 107, at 357. 
113 See id. (quoting John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 367 (Peter Laslett 
ed., 1965) (1690)). 
114 Id. at 356. 
115 See Arbery, supra note 84, at 552; Cahn, supra note 105, at 1415–16, 1419–20; 
Kenealy, supra note 66, at 207, 210. Abrams explains that the verb “essentialize” comes 
from the noun “essentialism,” which pejoratively refers to a “monolithic” women’s experi-
ence “that can be described independent of other facets of experience like race, class, and 
sexual orientation.” Abrams, supra note 72, at 1173 n.23 (quoting Angela Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 588 (1990)). 
116 See Cahn, supra note 105, at 1416. 
117 E.g., id.; see Ashraf, supra note 67, at 501–02 (discussing the U.S. Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board Study, which reported that sixty-four percent of women defined suggestive 
looks from coworker as sexual harassment, while thirty-six percent did not) (citing Office 
of Merit Review & Studies, U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., Sexual Harassment in 
Federal Government: An Update 14 (1988)), available at http://www.mspb.gov/studies/ 
rpt_june1988_harupdate/1988%20sexual%20harassment%20report.htm. 
118 See Ashraf, supra note 67, at 502. 
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terion before it is legally actionable.119 They point out that this certain 
acceptable criterion may look general, but is actually specific.120 They 
assert that a woman who does not fit into the confines of a white, up-
per-class, heterosexual profile may be unable to find a place in the rea-
sonable woman standard.121 
 Furthermore, feminist opponents argue that the reasonable woman 
standard is destructive to women because it actually embodies and per-
petuates stereotypes, requiring women to conform to them in order to 
obtain a legal remedy.122 They believe that because the reasonable 
woman will be defined by a mostly male judiciary, it is likely that the judi-
ciary will merely reflect preexisting stereotypes of womanhood as defined 
by men: that women are sensitive, delicate, and in need of special protec-
tion in the workplace.123 Ultimately, although it is easiest to simply use 
one stereotype to define the perceptions of all women on types of sexu-
ally harassing behavior, convenience does not justify the practice.124 
 In addition, opponents maintain that the reasonable woman stan-
dard would eventually undermine the legitimacy of sexual harassment 
claims by sending negative messages to women and exculpatory mes-
sages to men.125 On one hand, the standard tells women that they are 
inherently unreasonable, for if they were objectively reasonable, a sepa-
rate legal standard would not be necessary.126 Meanwhile, on the other 
hand, the standard provides men with an excuse, or plausible deniabil-
ity, for their behavior: how are they to know that their conduct was of-
fensive since they are not reasonable women?127 Underlying these mes-
                                                                                                                      
119 See Cahn, supra note 105, at 1416. 
120 See Bernstein, supra note 89, at 473; Cahn, supra note 105, at 1415. 
121 See Bernstein, supra note 89, at 473; Cahn, supra note 105, at 1415. Bernstein sug-
gests that the reasonable woman standard contains hidden normative premises, which 
elevates this one type of woman above others. See Bernstein, supra note 89, at 473. For 
more extensive discussions on essentialism and bias contained in defining the nature of 
“woman,” see Harris, supra note 115, at 588. 
122 See Cahn, supra note 105, at 1419. 
123 See Kenealy, supra note 66, at 204; Sharon J. Bittner, Note, The Reasonable Woman 
Standard After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Debate Rages On, 16 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 
127, 136 (1994). 
124 See Cahn, supra note 105, at 1419–20. 
125 See Kenealy, supra note 66, at 206, 210; Bittner, supra note 123, at 135. 
126 Kenealy, supra note 66, at 210. 
127 See Bittner, supra note 123, at 135; Kenealy, supra note 66, at 207. Kenealy asserts 
that the message the courts send through the reasonable woman standard is that “[m]en, 
intending only to be complimentary, unknowingly sexually harass women. Because women 
find it so unsettling, the courts will recognize a cause of action which would otherwise go 
undetected by reasonable men.” Kenealy, supra note 66, at 207. 
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sages, opponents find a trivializing and demeaning assumption: sexual 
harassment is more a matter of perception than a fact of reality.128 
 Opponents insist that in contrast, if all of society were to condemn 
sexual harassment, the conduct would be more effectively eradicated 
than it would be by condemnation from women alone.129 Therefore, 
only by applying the reasonable person standard can courts send the 
message “that sexual harassment is as visible and recognizable to men 
as it is to women, and that men whose conduct rises to the level of har-
assment are neither ignorant nor well-intentioned.”130 
 Finally, other opponents of the reasonable woman standard warn 
that it creates a slippery slope toward an impossibly fragmented juris-
prudence.131 Because Title VII bars discriminatory behavior based not 
only on sex, but also on race, color, religion, or national origin, some 
claim that the rationale for adopting a reasonable woman standard 
could easily be applied to adopting a separate standard for any minority 
group— “reasonable Haitian woman,” “reasonable African-Americans,” 
“reasonable Muslims.”132 
3. Application Yields Unnecessary Confusion 
 According to those opposed to separate reasonableness standards, 
the reasonable woman standard injects needless confusion into the law 
by asking men, who make up the majority of both judges and employ-
ers, to apply it.133 Many wonder: if the true nature of sexual harassment 
can only be perceived through the eyes and minds of women, then how 
                                                                                                                      
128 Kenealy, supra note 66, at 209. Even more trivializing is the notion that “special” 
treatment for women is necessary because women’s reactions to workplace behavior simply 
do not follow the expected, normal human responses. See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the 
Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 41, 64 (1989). 
129 Arbery, supra note 84, at 540–41. 
130 Kenealy, supra note 66, at 204. 
131 See Unikel, supra note 107, at 350. Scales warns against trusting “slippery slope” argu-
ments; however, in this case, the idea for separate minority group standards has had some 
legal and scholarly support. See Scales, supra note 1, at 106–07. In Harris v. International Paper 
Co., the district court explicitly adopted the “reasonable black person” standard to determine 
whether a hostile work environment existed. 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (D. Me. 1991), vacated 
in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (1991). More recently, in Muzzy v. Cahillane Motors, 
Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a jury instruction containing the 
term “objectively reasonable woman of lesbian orientation.” 749 N.E.2d 691, 693, 698 (Mass. 
2001); see also Tran, supra note 5, at 357 (advocating the application of a “reasonable minority 
woman” standard); Meri O. Triades, Finding a Hostile Work Environment: The Search for a Rea-
sonable Reasonableness Standard, 8 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Ancestry L.J. 35 (2002) (ex-
plaining the need for a “reasonable black woman” standard). 
132 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); see Adler & Pierce, supra note 8, at 822–23. 
133 See Kenealy, supra note 66, at 206; Ashraf, supra note 67, at 496, 500. 
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can men be expected to reach the correct decision through their own 
faculties?134 For example, if a male judge or employer uses a woman he 
knows well as reference points, such as his wife, he risks essentializing 
all women based on his wife’s race, class, and sexual orientation.135 If, 
however, he employs his own perspective, then he is merely applying a 
male-biased view of what he thinks the reasonable woman’s perception 
should be.136 Thus, men cannot be expected to successfully apply a rea-
sonableness standard based on a woman’s perspective.137 Opponents 
contend that this needless confusion not only subjects employers to 
substantial financial liability; the confusion also inhibits employers’ abil-
ity to shape the behavior of their employees by effectuating company 
policies to abide by legal standards.138 
4. Equality Goals of Title VII 
 Those who defend the reasonable person standard stress that Title 
VII prohibits employment practices that deprive individuals of equal 
status on the basis of group affiliation.139 Consequently, the equality Title 
VII seeks to achieve will only exist in the workplace when a reasonable 
person, male or female, can identify and object to harassing conduct.140 
 Although the reasonable woman standard may seem to be a legal 
victory for women, its opponents claim that it threatens to do more 
harm than good.141 Instead of promoting gender equality, it entrenches 
essentialism and stereotyping.142 Instead of legitimizing sexual harass-
ment claims, it suggests that certain conduct is actionable solely be-
                                                                                                                      
134 Johnson, supra note 45, at 642. 
135 Bernstein, supra note 89, at 474. 
136 See id. 
137 See Ashraf, supra note 67, at 500. Consequently, the reasonable woman standard fails 
to assure greater reliance on the female perspective than does the reasonable person stan-
dard. Unikel, supra note 107, at 369. Some opponents assert that the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 negates the entire argument that the reasonable woman standard is 
necessary to compensate for the male-dominated judiciary because the Act allows the issue 
of reasonableness to be decided by a jury. See Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
Before the 1991 Act, a trial by jury was generally denied for Title VII actions. See Johnson, 
supra note 45, at 667; Ashraf, supra note 67, at 496. Presumably, since the passage of the 
Act, there will be women on the jury who will prevent the application of a judge’s male-
biased standard. See Ashraf, supra note 67, at 501. 
138 See Ashraf, supra note 67, at 496. 
139 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1994); Arbery, supra note 84, at 505. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Bittner, supra note 123, at 137. 
141 See Arbery, supra note 84, at 506. 
142 See Cahn, supra note 105, at 1416; Unikel, supra note 107, at 352; Arbery, supra note 
84, at 506. 
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cause women are hypersensitive.143 Instead of deterring unreasonable 
conduct by setting clear guidelines, it confuses employers about the 
policies they are expected to enforce.144 
 According to its opponents, the reasonable woman standard is an-
tithetical to the most basic goal of Title VII—the elimination of dis-
crimination in the workplace.145 Such opponents even contend that the 
reasonable woman standard is as inappropriate and divisive as the once-
normative reasonable man standard.146 Furthermore, courts can only 
affirm that reasonable women are as reasonable as anyone else and that 
sexual harassment is recognizable by both men and women if they ex-
amine sexual harassment claims through the neutral perspective of the 
reasonable person.147 Defenders of the reasonable person standard 
maintain that equality should remain the ideal, and that the law can 
have no favorites.148 
III. Has She Made a Difference? 
 Ann Scales suggests that “bickering about rules and standards in 
the abstract” has led feminists to waste decades trying to create the 
“new, improved equality standard . . . [to finally achieve] justice in the 
world.”149 Similarly, some legal researchers have wondered whether this 
debate over semantic legal standards is a just waste of time.150 Two re-
cent studies question whether jurors are even capable of changing their 
perspectives when given a different standard, thereby altering the final 
judgments in sexual harassment cases.151 These studies, one conducted 
in 1995 and the other in 2002, reached the same conclusions: (1) men 
are less likely than women to perceive sexual harassment in a given 
situation; and (2) changes in the legal standard applied yielded no im-
pact on the final judgments of harassment.152 Both concluded that the 
reasonable woman standard is an ineffective remedy for the effects of 
                                                                                                                      
143 See Kenealy, supra note 66, at 210; Arbery, supra note 84, at 551. 
144 Ashraf, supra note 67, at 484. 
145 Id. 
146 Bittner, supra note 123, at 137. 
147 Kenealy, supra note 66, at 209–10. 
148 See Keeton et al., supra note 105, at § 32; Arbery, supra note 84, at 553. 
149 Scales, supra note 1, at 84. 
150 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 669; Richard L. Weiner et al., Social Analytic In-
vestigation of Hostile Work Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 263, 276 (1995). 
151 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 658; Weiner et al., supra note 150, at 276. 
152 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 667; Weiner et al., supra note 150, at 276. 
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the gender difference in perceptions of hostile environment sexual 
harassment.153 
 However, it may be instructive to look at the past fifteen years of 
sexual harassment case law data to understand how the application of 
the two different reasonableness standards has actually affected out-
comes for plaintiffs.154 Analyzing case law data is not an easy task. For 
that reason, this analysis is very narrowly focused on the reasonableness 
standard used to assess the hostile work environment element of a sex-
ual harassment claim.155 By isolating this one variable from the many 
others that influence ultimate outcomes of hostile work environment 
cases, this analysis seeks to discern any possible correlation between the 
reasonableness standard applied and the successful establishment of an 
objectively hostile work environment.156 
A. Reasonableness Standard Actually Employed by Circuit 
 Part of what has caused the debate over standards to regenerate 
over the years is that some circuit courts have not followed their own 
precedents.157 For example, in the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits, the courts have seemingly adopted the reasonable 
woman standard in some cases, only to follow it by years of consistent 
applications of the reasonable person instead.158 Therefore, in order to 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 669; Weiner et al., supra note 150, at 278. 
154 See Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 669; Weiner et al., supra note 150, at 278. 
155 For a much more expansive survey, comprehensively covering the final conclusions 
reached in every federal appellate court opinion on sexual harassment law between 1986 
and 1995, see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 58. 
156 See id. at 571, 572. Other possible variables include, for example, the specific facts 
of the case; how sensitive the judge is to context; general regional sentiments on sexual 
harassment, race, and class of the victim and the harasser; and type of employment. See id. 
While any of these other variables may be equally, if not more, important in any given case 
or jurisdiction, this study assumes cetaris paribus in order to examine the effect of the rea-
sonableness standard applied. See id. 
157 For a sampling of cases where courts have failed to follow precedent, see infra note 
158. 
158 Compare Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying a reason-
able woman standard), Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(applying a reasonable woman standard), Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 
959, 962 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting a reasonable woman standard), and Lipsett v. Univ. 
of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting the importance of the woman’s perspec-
tive), with Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying a reasonable 
person standard), Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996) (accept-
ing a reasonable person standard); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 444 
(7th Cir. 1994) (applying a reasonable person standard), and Morgan v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 
901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying a reasonable person’s perspective). 
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analyze the effect of the reasonable woman standard, it is necessary to 
first determine which standard is currently being used the majority of 
the time in each jurisdiction.159 
 In most cases to date, the Ninth and Third Circuits have applied a 
gender-specific reasonableness standard.160 All other circuits either ap-
ply a reasonable person standard or mention objective and subjective 
components but fail to apply any reasonableness test at all.161 Only the 
Fifth Circuit has explicitly rejected the reasonable woman standard; 
however, the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have indirectly opted 
for the reasonable person over the reasonable woman.162 
B. Rates of Plaintiff Success: Establishing an Objectively  
Hostile Work Environment 
 The greatest hope of proponents of the reasonable woman stan-
dard was that the new standard would allow more female plaintiffs to 
meet the objective test for hostile work environment claims, thereby 
                                                                                                                      
159 See, e.g., Torres, 116 F.3d at 633 n.6; Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1356 n.22 
(11th Cir. 1997). Legal scholars have conducted similar analyses, reaching different con-
clusions based on the year conducted. Compare Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 637–38 & 
nn.23–25 (noting that the Third and Ninth Circuits use reasonable woman, while all other 
circuits use either reasonable person or victim standards), with Bittner, supra note 123, at 
127 nn.4 & 5 (noting that the Second, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted 
reasonable person standard, while the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
adopted reasonable woman standard). 
160 See, e.g., Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 
2005) (adopting the “reasonable woman” standard); Shramban v. Aetna, 115 F. App’x 578, 
579 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the standard of a “reasonable person of the same sex in that 
position”). But see, e.g., Clegg v. Falcon Plastics, Inc., 174 F. App’x 18, 24 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(requiring the application of the reasonable person standard); Walpole v. City of Mesa, 162 
F. App’x 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring use of the reasonable person standard). 
161 See, e.g., Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 
2006) (applying reasonable person standard); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 269 
(4th Cir. 2006) (applying reasonable person standard); Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 
640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005) (deciding that a hostile work environment requires both subjec-
tive and objective severity or pervasiveness); Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221–22 (2d 
Cir 2004) (considering reasonable woman, but applying reasonable person standard); 
Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying the reasonable 
person standard). 
162 Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding no reversible er-
ror in “reasonable person” standard after Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
21(1993)); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding “rea-
sonable person” standard appropriate after Supreme Court’s use in Harris, 510 U.S. at 21); 
Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 1996) (adopting Radtke v. Everett, 501 
N.W.2d 155, 165 (Mich. 1993), which “concludes that a gender-conscious standard must be 
rejected”); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a ‘reasonable woman.’”). 
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leading to more favorable legal outcomes.163 The greatest fear of objec-
tors was that the new standard would preordain outcomes for female 
plaintiffs, thereby unfairly punishing employers.164 After fifteen years of 
jurisprudence, neither dream nor nightmare has become reality.165 
 This survey reviews 281 cases of hostile work environment claims 
that have arisen in each federal district.166 The review consisted of a 
tailored assessment of two factors: (1) which of the two reasonableness 
standards, if any, was articulated by the court; and (2) whether the 
court found that the plaintiff had successfully established that the con-
duct was severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile 
work environment.167 However, it should be noted that this data is not 
concerned with any ultimate conclusions regarding overall plaintiff win 
rates for hostile work environment claims.168 These results provide only 
a glimpse, at best, into an over-arching trend in hostile work environ-
ment judgments as they relate to the reasonableness standard used.169 
 
Table 1: Rates of Plaintiff Success in Establishing Objective Hostile Work Environment  
Circuit Reasonableness Standard Results 
 
Woman Person None Wins Losses 
% of Plaintiff 
Success 
1st 0 13 0 9 4 69.23 
2d 1 14 16 17 14 54.83 
4th 0 9 6 8 7 53.33 
3d 17 6 0 12 11 52.17 
D.C. 0 1 3 2 2 50 
9th 20 4 0 11 13 45.83 
10th 0 10 16 11 15 42.3 
8th 1 26 17 17 27 38.63 
5th 0 13 0 5 8 38.46 
11th 0 8 8 6 10 37.5 
6th 1 22 5 8 20 28.57 
7th 1 29 14 12 32 27.27 
                                                                                                                      
163 See Baker, supra note 64, at 713. 
164 See Ashraf, supra note 67, at 502; Unikel, supra note 107, at 335. 
165 See infra note 170 and accompanying table and text. 
166 The cases chosen for review were identified on the courts of appeal database in 
Westlaw, using the command “78K1185 & REASONABLE.” Many of the cases reviewed are 
not officially published. 
167 For the purposes of this survey, see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
168 Simply because a plaintiff successfully established the objectively hostile prong of 
the claim does not suggest that the plaintiff also met the other requirements of a hostile 
work environment claim, such as liability, or that the harassment was based on sex. See 
Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Even if a work environment is 
found to be hostile, a plaintiff must also show that the conduct creating the hostile work 
environment should be imputed to the employer.”). 
169 See infra note 170 and accompanying table and text. 
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 Table 1 shows that plaintiff success rates vary by circuit. In the 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, plaintiffs only es-
tablished the objective element in their hostile work environment cases 
in twenty-seven to thirty-eight percent of appellate cases. Meanwhile, in 
the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, plaintiffs established the 
objective element in fifty-two to sixty-nine percent of their cases on ap-
peal. 
 However, the results of this data do not show that an application of 
the reasonable woman standard necessarily leads to significantly higher 
hostile work environment success rates than a strict use of the reason-
able person standard, or even no reasonableness test at all.170 Moreover, 
it is interesting to note that all four of the circuits that have considered 
the reasonable woman standard and have then rejected it in favor of 
the reasonable person (the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits) 
rank on the lowest end of plaintiff success rates.171 This data may reveal 
that there are other variables at play in these cases, which are equally, if 
not more significant than the reasonableness standard articulated by 
the court.172 
 As prior studies have concluded, the reasonable woman standard 
does not appear to be an effective means of changing the rate of which 
female plaintiffs are able to establish that the harassing conduct created 
an objectively hostile work environment.173 However, the fact that both 
                                                                                                                      
170 See, e.g., Hathaway v. Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, 123 F. App’x 806, 808 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (finding conduct insufficient for a reasonable woman to consider environment 
abusive). But see, e.g., Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 89, 94 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (ruling that the plaintiff wins under the reasonable person standard); Schiano v. 
Quality Sys., Inc. 445 F.3d 597, 604, 606 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff meets 
burden under hostile work environment without articulation of any reasonableness stan-
dard). 
171 See, e.g., Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 
2006) (concluding plaintiff failed to meet high threshold under reasonable person stan-
dard); Tatt v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 138 F. App’x 145, 148 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding plain-
tiff failed to establish objectively reasonable belief that defendant’s conduct constituted 
actionable sexual harassment); Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 611, 612 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (finding plaintiff failed to allege harassment that a reasonable person would 
find hostile or abusive); Valentine-Johnson v. Roche, 386 F.3d 800, 814 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(finding no actionable hostile work environment because court previously rejected claims 
based on more sexually offensive circumstances). 
172 See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 58, at 571, 572. One such significant variable may 
be geography, considering the fact that the six districts with the highest plaintiff success 
rates represent the Northeast and both coasts; meanwhile, the six districts with the lowest 
plaintiff success rates represent the South and Midwest. 
173 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(1)(a) (1994); see Shoenfelt et al., supra note 6, at 669; Weiner 
et al., supra note 150, at 278. 
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of the circuits that have adopted the gender-specific standard (the 
Ninth and the Third) have generated higher plaintiff success rates than 
all four of those that have rejected it (Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh) 
may be cause for further investigation.174 
Conclusion 
 In 1990, Wendy Pollack wrote, “Women have named sexual har-
assment, but have lost control of the content of its definition.”175 Along 
the same lines, whether the court applies the gender-specific reason-
ableness standard or not, it fails to provide a framework or gauge by 
which to analyze the content of the claim.176 This might suggest that 
either reasonableness standard has the potential to benefit sexual har-
assment plaintiffs.177 
 Despite strident arguments impugning the Court to reconcile the 
circuit court split, the reasonable woman standard does not appear to 
                                                                                                                      
174 See, e.g., Nitsche, 446 F.3d at 846 (concluding plaintiff failed to meet high threshold 
under reasonable person standard); Tatt, 138 F. App’x at 148 (finding plaintiff failed to 
establish objectively reasonable belief that defendant’s conduct constituted actionable 
sexual harassment); Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1034–35 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (finding defendant’s conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive, under the reason-
able woman standard, to support a hostile work environment claim); Septimus, 399 F.3d at 
611, 612 (finding plaintiff failed to allege harassment that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive); Roche, 386 F.3d at 814 (finding no actionable hostile work environment 
because court previously rejected claims based on more sexually offensive circumstances); 
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25–26 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding plaintiff satis-
fied hostile work environment claim under reasonable person of same sex standard). 
175 Pollack, supra note 70, at 48. 
176 See Kenealy, supra note 66, at 204. 
177 See King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Writing for the Federal Cir-
cuit in King, Judge Pauline Newman articulated this sentiment, finding it unnecessary to 
enter the reasonable woman versus reasonable person debate because neither standard 
would alter the court’s intent to eliminate "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women" in employment. See 21 F.3d at 1582 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). As the King court stated: 
We need not enter this debate, for no principled argument supports the view 
that sex-based offensive behavior in the workplace is immune from remedy 
simply because it may be culturally tolerated outside of the workplace. The 
purpose of Title VII is not to import into the workplace the prejudices of the 
community, but through law to liberate the workplace from the demeaning 
influence of discrimination, and thereby to implement the goals of human 
dignity and economic equality in employment. 
Id. Contrarily, others might interpret this finding as proof that neither standard works 
because tort law is simply incompatible with the goals of Title VII. See Sexual Harassment 
Claims, supra note 33, at 1463–64; Cahn, supra note 105, at 1433 (“[C]ourts that use a rea-
sonable woman standard can apply it in a manner that subordinates women just as easily as 
one that supports women.”). 
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be a factor determinative of hostile work environment success rates.178 
Considering this lack of significant impact on outcomes, it is no wonder 
why the Supreme Court has refused to weigh in on this controversial 
issue.179 
                                                                                                                      
178 See Brennan, supra note 5, at 547; Hill, supra note 1, at 172; Kerns, supra note 17, at 
206–07. 
179 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys. 
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); Hill, supra note 1, at 172. 
